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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this paper, we estimate the demand for homeowner insurance in Florida. Since 
we are interested in a number of factors influencing demand, we approach the 
problem from two directions.  We first estimate two hedonic equations 
representing the premium per contract and the price mark-up.  We analyze how 
the contracts are bundled and how contract provisions, insurer characteristics 
and insured risk characteristics and demographics influence the premium per 
contract and the price mark-up.  Second, we estimate the demand for homeowners 
insurance using two-stage least squares regression.  We employ ISO's indicated 
loss costs as our proxy for real insurance services demanded.  We assume that the 
demand for coverage is essentially a joint demand and thus we can estimate the 
demand for catastrophe coverage separately from the demand for non-
catastrophe coverage. We determine that price elasticities are less elastic for 
catastrophic coverage than for non-catastrophic coverage.  Further estimated 
income elasticities suggest that  homeowners insurance is an inferior good.  
Finally, we conclude based on the results of a selection model that our sample of 
ISO reporting companies well represents the demand for insurance in the Florida 
market as a whole. The Demand for Catastrophe Insurance with Bundled Catastrophic Coverages 
 
I. Introduction 
 
A. The Problem of Catastrophic Risk 
The risk of natural disasters in the U.S. has significantly increased in recent years, 
straining private insurance markets and creating troublesome problems for disaster-prone areas. 
The threat of mega-catastrophes resulting from intense hurricanes or earthquakes striking major 
population centers has dramatically altered the insurance environment. Estimates of probable 
maximum losses (PMLs) to insurers from a mega-catastrophe range from $50-$115 billion 
depending on the location and intensity of the event (RMS/ISO, 1995).
1 Under current 
conditions, many insurers could become insolvent or financially impaired if a mega-catastrophe 
occurred, with rippling effects throughout insurance markets and the economy (ISO, 1996a).
2 
Increased catastrophe risk poses difficult challenges for insurers, reinsurers, property 
owners and public officials (Kleindorfer and Kunreuther, 1999). The fundamental dilemma 
concerns insurers’ ability to finance low-probability, high-consequence (LPHC) events, which 
generates a host of interrelated issues with respect to how the risk of such events are managed, 
financed and priced at various levels (Russell and Jaffe, 1997). Insurers have sought to raise their 
prices and decrease their exposure to catastrophe losses, while looking for efficient ways to 
diversify their exposure through reinsurance and securitization. 
However, state legislators and insurance regulators have resisted insurers’ efforts to raise 
prices and terminate policies in an attempt to preserve the availability and affordability of 
insurance coverage (Klein, 1998). Regulatory restrictions have been complemented by state 
residual insurance mechanisms with significant flaws (Marlett and Eastman, 1997). Government 
                                                 
1 These maximum probable loss (PML) estimates are based on a 500-year “return” period. In other words, the 
probability that a loss would occur in any given year that would exceed the PML is one in 500. 
 
2 An Insurance Services Office (1996a) study estimated the impact of severe catastrophes on the financial condition 
of 80 insurer groups that report detailed statistical data to ISO. Utilizing catastrophe models, ISO estimated that a 
mega-catastrophe causing $50 billion or more in insured losses could result in 36 percent of insurers becoming 
insolvent and many more becoming financially impaired, depending on their location. The ISO analysis included 
estimates of the impact of insurers’ reinsurance arrangements based on information available from Best’s Reports. 
The companies in the ISO sample represented approximately 28 percent of total industry property insurance 
premiums. For a model and further estimates of industry capacity to cover catastrophe losses, see also Cummins, 
Doherty and Lo (1999). 
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policies have imposed significant cross-subsides from low-risk to high-risk areas as well as cross 
subsidies from non-catastrophe lines of insurance to the catastrophe lines. These policies distort 
incentives and undermine the ability of market forces to make necessary adjustments and operate 
effectively in managing catastrophe risk (Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer, 1999). 
 
B. Overview of Study 
As concerns about natural disasters have assumed center stage, researchers have begun to 
explore the special problems disasters pose as well as their implications for insurance markets. 
Understandably, recent research on catastrophe risk has focused on the topics of industry 
capacity, reinsurance, securitization, and mitigation.  Yet, much  less is known about the 
microeconomics of catastrophe insurance markets at the primary level (i.e., transactions between 
primary insurers and individual consumers). Analyzing the supply of and demand for catastrophe 
insurance and integrating this analysis  with research on risk diversification and mitigation is 
essential to formulating a more complete picture of the catastrophe risk problem and evaluating 
viable solutions. 
This paper constitutes the first significant attempt to examine the nature of the demand 
for insurance against natural disasters at a detailed, micro-economic level.
3 Our examination has 
been made possible with the unprecedented assembly of an extensive, detailed database on 
residential insurance transactions affected by catastrophe risk.
4 These data are supplemented by 
information on insurer financial and organizational characteristics and the demographics of 
residential households at a Zip code level. 
We explore several significant aspects of residential insurance markets threatened by 
natural disasters. Our initial  work encompasses the key determinants of the demand for 
residential/catastrophe insurance and their effects on the quantity, quality and price of insurance 
                                                 
3 A “master monograph” (Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer, 2000) is available that presents additional information about 
this research, including discussion of the institutional context for catastrophe insurance markets and detailed 
descriptions of the data used. 
 
4 These data were provided to the authors on a confidential basis by the Insurance Services Office (ISO). The 
insurers included in this database granted explicit permission for the authors to use these data under a confidentiality 
agreement. 
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purchased. Among the phenomena we seek to illuminate are the sensitivity of demand to prices, 
policy features and the bundling/unbundling of perils and coverages. 
In this paper, we focus our analysis on demand side of homeowners insurance transactions 
in Florida. Further we hope to build a complementary supply model for both states and also 
integrate transactions for dwelling fire and extended coverage.
5  
 
C. Summary of Initial Findings 
At least two interesting observations arise from this analysis.  First, we find that 
catastrophe coverage is more price sensitive than non-catastrophe coverage when we examine 
markets where both HO3 and HO5 policies are sold.  When we look only at HO3 policies, 
however, the reverse is true.  Second catastrophic coverage is an inferior good.  Thus, as income 
rises the demand for catastrophic coverage is reduced.  In contrast, the demand for non-
catastrophic coverage is positively related to income and is a normal good.  Overall, however, 
the demand for homeowners insurance is an inferior good. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides background on the demand for insurance 
that we will use in our methodology; Section III contains a description of the methodology and 
the results; Section IV summarizes the  results of our analysis  and briefly describes future 
research directions. 
 
II. The Demand for Homeowners Insurance in Florida  
A. Introduction to the Demand Analysis 
To obtain estimates of the demand for homeowners insurance products, significant amounts 
of micro-level data are required. With the assistance of the Insurance Services Office (ISO), we 
obtained information from a group of primary insurers writing business in Florida and New York 
that report detailed premium and exposure data to ISO. We use the data for the four-year period 
                                                 
5 A small but significant proportion of homes (roughly 10 percent) are insured by dwelling fire policies that also 
may include extended coverage. These transactions are of interest as they represent a different approach to covering 
property risks than the more common homeowners multiperil package policies. The less bundled nature of these 
contracts may be more attractive to some insurers and homeowners when high catastrophe risk causes high prices 
for homeowners multiperil policies. 
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1995-1998 for the analyses that are reported here.
6  
The database contains full homeowners premium and exposure data  for 60 companies, 
comprising some 20 groups, taken as a snapshot in the first quarter of each of the four years, 
1995-1998. Each exposure record contains slightly aggregated information on similar groups of 
policies in every Zip code in which reporting companies did business. The information contains 
relevant data regarding the characteristics of the policies actually purchased by homeowners for 
each such company, including premiums, structural information on the nature of the insured 
property, and coverages purchased. Additionally, we have compiled financial and organizational 
data on the insurers in our sample, as well as household economic and demographic data (from 
the 1990 Census) by Zip code. 
By analyzing locational information (Zip code, standard ISO  reporting territory and 
community characteristics), information on the company selling the policy, and Census 
information on the socio-demographic characteristics of each Zip code, a very rich picture of the 
nature of demand for homeowners insurance coverage can be deduced using standard 
econometric techniques. It should be noted that the database constructed has exposure records for 
Florida and New York for both homeowners multiperil coverages as well as dwelling fire and 
extended coverage policies that offer less bundled coverages for non-catastrophe and catastrophe 
perils. This paper will focus only on homeowner multiperil coverage policies in Florida, leaving 
to a later paper the joint analysis of multiperil and dwelling fire policies as well as an analysis of 
the supply and demand for homeowners insurance in both Florida and New York. The peril of 
interest in this vein of research is windstorm, particularly hurricanes.
7 We first provide a brief 
introduction to the foundations of the modeling used in this process. 
 
                                                 
6 The sample of insurers was drawn from the top 50 insurer groups in New York and Florida in terms of market 
share. It should be noted that our database contains only a subset of insurers that report statistical data to ISO. While 
a cross-section of companies is represented in terms of size, organizational forms, and distribution systems, large 
direct writers that do not report to ISO are not included in this analysis. In subsequent analyses, we hope to include 
data from large insurers who do not report data to ISO.  Further, we have not yet compared our sample companies 
with all companies writing homeowners insurance in New York and Florida to see how accurately or sample reflects 
the total markets in these states. 
 
7 In later work we may attempt to model the supply and demand for earthquake insurance in states such as California 
and Missouri. However, the data for such an analysis is more limited and the role of the California Earthquake 
Authority presents some special challenges.  
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B. Modeling the Demand for Insurance Products 
Introduction to the Structure of Demand for Homeowners Insurance 
There are several features of this market that serve to constrain and structure the analysis of 
demand. First, we assume that homeowners insurance, including coverage against windstorm 
damage, is essentially mandatory, although some homeowners may elect a "no coverage" policy, 
i.e., they have no property insurance.
8 (Consider this "no coverage" option as purchasing an 
insurance product with "infinite deductibles" at a price of zero.) Also, insureds may elect to 
exclude wind coverage from their policy. Second, as a number of previous analyses have shown 
(e.g., Joskow, 1973; Cummins and Weiss, 1991; and Grace, Klein and Kleindorfer, 1999), the 
market for homeowners insurance products is workably competitive.
9  
The basic demand problem for the homeowner is to select a single optimal policy from 
among the menu of policies offered in the market. This involves a complex tradeoff among the 
various attributes of the coverage and options purchased, the characteristics and needs of the 
homeowner, and the perceived quality of the companies from which coverage can be purchased. 
Demand in this market arises from the optimal consumer choice of a bundle of product and 
company attributes, given the personal characteristics of each homeowner and the economic and 
demographic characteristics of the neighborhood (i.e., Zip code) where he resides. The feasible 
set of such "bundled products" is the set of insurance policies, coverage options, and company 
attributes that can be sustained in a competitive equilibrium under certain regulatory 
constraints.
10 
The theoretical foundation for this demand analysis, and the interacting market equilibrium, 
are based on a model of price-quality competition (e.g., Gal-or, 1983). In a competitive market, 
                                                 
8 Lenders typically require hazard insurance for homes with mortgages. It is possible that some homeowners without 
a mortgage have opted not to purchase insurance.  We shall control for this in the models below using census data 
(as of 1990) on the percent of homeowners having mortgages in each ZIP code represented in our sample. However, 
insurers typically require homeowner to insure 80 percent (or more) of the value of real estate (as the land is not 
insurable).  It is quite possible that people might still have mortgage payments to make, but opt out of insuring 
because the mortgage is less than 20 percent of the property's value. 
 
9 Indeed, the standard structural and performance benchmarks, such as concentration ratios and various financial 
indicators of profitability and excess profits, would underscore this statement.  
 
10 In this paper, we do not explicitly model or estimate the effects of regulatory constraints. We have conducted 
some preliminary analysis in this area and will incorporate a regulatory component in future papers. 
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the differences in what homeowners are willing to pay for various features will be reflected in 
the price at which various bundled products with these features sell. Thus, what we model is 
essentially a regression of observed price in the market against various features of the products 
sold and the companies that sell them. We are interested in the factors that appear to influence 
demand  and whether these factors appear reasonable on the basis of theory. Since there is 
considerable evidence that many homeowners do not search thoroughly for “best offers”, we are 
also interested in aspects of the market that appear to arise from behavioral considerations (e.g., 
Kunreuther, 1998b), including the price dispersion of similar policies offered in  the same 
territory.
11 
At the outset, we rely on the following features of the homeowners insurance market in our 
modeling. While the structure of this market may be workably competitive, it is nonetheless a 
regulated market (Klein, 1998). On the demand side, this does not occasion any theoretical 
difficulties as the model we develop attempts only to explain, for policies actually offered in the 
market, how various features are valued, within the feature (e.g., various deductible levels) and 
across features (e.g., deductible levels versus type of coverage). It is important to bear in mind 
that, because of regulation, the set of policies offered in the market, and their prices in particular, 
are not necessarily the result of a perfectly competitive market. 
We assume that the set of policies offered by companies, together with their underwriting 
and marketing strategies, are expected profit maximizing, subject to imposed regulatory 
constraints. This suggests that companies find the regulatory policies imposed not so onerous as 
to cause them to leave the state. Nonetheless, because of such policies, catastrophe coverages in 
some areas might require “underbracing” or cross subsidies from other lines of business, non-
catastrophe coverages and catastrophe coverages in other areas. These cross subsidies may be 
sustainable in equilibrium if they allow insurance companies to earn a reasonable rate of return 
on all lines of business and if they are supported by consumer preferences for certain feature 
bundles and cross-marketing. The continuation of these cross subsidies over time implies some 
                                                 
11 We should note that one source of price dispersion is the fact that insurance companies differentiate themselves in 
term of underwriting stringency. Insurers with more stringent underwriting standards, labeled “preferred insurers”, 
tend to have the lowest prices. “Standard” and “non-standard” companies tend to have higher prices. Some insureds 
may pay higher than necessary prices if they would qualify for coverage from a preferred insurer, but intentionally 
or inadvertently purchase coverage from a standard or non-standard insurer. 
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further inertia that may, at least in part, be due to regulatory restrictions on terminating policies 
and other insurer and consumer considerations.
12 Beyond the obvious implications for 
understanding rate adequacy and precision, this suggests the importance of detecting cross-
marketing synergies in the demand and supply analysis, as well a s detecting trends in  the 
aggregate supply  of  particular insurers in terms of increasing the diversification of their 
portfolios of insurance policies. 
 
Defining Price and Modeling Demand for Homeowner Policies 
Assume that a particular homeowner, with characteristics Z (income, family status, type of 
structure, etc.), faces a choice among different policy options for insuring his home, where the 
set H gives the available policy options in the homeowners market. A typical such option "h" in 
the set  H would be one offered by firm  i (with characteristics Xi) with certain policy features 
such as deductible levels, loss settlement provisions (i.e., actual cash value or replacement cost), 
and premium  P(h). The homeowner must choose one of the o ptions in  H and does so by 
maximizing his expected utility over the risks or gambles implied by each choice h. Let us 
represent this expected utility U(h, P(h)) in quasi-linear form
13 as: 
 
                                          (1) 
where V represents, for a consumer of type Z, the consumer's willingness to pay for various 
coverages or "features" of an insurance policy and F(h) represents the vector of such features, 
including the characteristics of the company offering the policy that may make a difference to 
consumers. Note that both V and P are shown to depend on only the vector of features F and the 
characteristics of the homeowner (possibly only the type of structure, but perhaps also such 
                                                 
12 See Bartlett, Klein and Russell (1999) for a discussion of how regulation-imposed insurance price subsidies may 
be sustained for a period of time. 
 
13 As Willig (1976) has shown, this form, with constant marginal utility of income, is appropriate for demand 
modeling when the good in question does not absorb a significant fraction of the homeowner’s budget, a reasonable 
assumption in the case of insurance (the typical homeowners insurance premium is around $300-$500 and somewhat 
higher in catastrophe-prone areas). This is not to say, of course, that there are no income effects across consumers, 
only that the marginal utility of income for each consumer is assumed constant over the range of policy options 
offered. 
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locational characteristics as community rating or location of nearest fire department). This is 
without loss of generality since one of these features could itself be the premium level P(h). The 
homeowner then maximizes the function U(h, P(h), Z) over the set H. Assuming that the features 
can be more or less continuously varied (that is, there is a rich menu of policies available in the 
market), we can represent the choice problem as choosing an insurance policy by choosing 
optimal features of the policy. This leads to a solution to the homeowner's maximization problem 
characterized by MV/MFi = MP/MFi, which of course varies with consumer characteristics Z. 
From this logic, one can understand the structure of demand in this market by examining the 
structure of how premiums vary with policy features.
14 This leads to estimation problems of the 
following general type, neglecting for the moment the details here of functional form: 
                                      (2) 
where we have separated the policy features into categories: those pertaining to the policy itself 
(the vector  F); those that pertain to the company (the vector  X); and those pertaining to 
neighborhood characteristics (the vector Z). In this model, P(F, X, Z) could be either the total 
premium for a given policy or more likely, normalizing by units of coverage (e.g., the expected 
or indicated loss costs), premium per unit of coverage. 
"Price" for insurance products, as for other products and services, is defined on the basis of 
value-added per unit (in this case, per dollar) of output. At the policy level, this value-added 
measure of price can be captured by subtracting the discounted value of expected losses covered 
by the policy from the policy's premium.
15 Denoting by L(F, Z) the expected losses for a policy h 
with features F and by P(F, X, Z) its premium, we obtain the following definition of price p(F, X, 
Z) for a homeowners policy h = (F, X, Z) characterized by the parameters (F, X) and indexed by 
consumer and loss characteristics Z: 
 
                                                 
14 Indeed, if V and P are estimated using bilinear or translog families of functions, then knowledge of one will lead 
(up to a constant of integration) to knowledge of the other.  
 
15 Note that we do not consider the effects of taxes in this model. See Myers and Cohn (1987) and Cummins (1990) 
for a more detailed discussion of “price” in the insurance context. See also Cummins, Weiss and Zi (1999) for a 
related empirical study of price and profitability using frontier efficiency methods. As noted in the latter paper, the 
definition of price in (3) properly accounts for the insurer’s expenses and the opportunity costs of the owner's capital 
invested in the insurance business. 
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                                          (3) 
   
where PV(L(F, Z)) = L(F, Z)/(1+r) is the present value of expected losses on the policy for the 
policy period and "r" is the insurer's return on equity for the period. L(F,Z) is the indicated loss 
costs per unit of coverage for the policy features (F) and structure (Z) in question. We will, in 
fact, directly estimate (3) using a functional form similar to (2). For the ISO database underlying 
this study, we have information on the premium charged for each policy (or group of identical 
policies), "r" is the average ratio of investment income to earned premiums for insurers, and L(F, 
Z) represents the advisory Indicated Loss Costs (ILC), as computed  using  ISO filed loss cost 
manuals and rules, for the policy characteristics (F, Z).
16 
We further analyze the Indicated Loss Costs. We employ our indicated loss costs as a 
measure of real insurance services output. Using ISO loss cost filing information, we calculated 
an expected indicated loss cost for each contract.
17 That is, ISO loss cost information can be used 
to determine the expected loss costs for a given homeowners policy  form  that covers a brick 
house in Zip code 30029 with  certain specified coverage provisions and 
endorsements/exclusions, such as ordinance/law coverage. ISO also has provided information on 
catastrophe loss costs and a  non-catastrophe loss costs that we have applied to each possible 
combination of location, policy form, and additional contract terms. Thus, we can estimate three 
additional regressions. 
Indicated loss costs  for  a particular policy are an estimate of the expected claims costs 
(including claims adjustment expenses) of insurance coverage under the terms of that policy for a 
particular house. Thus, indicated loss costs are a proxy for the amount of insurance embodied in 
a specific policy. One could also employ the Coverage A limit as a proxy for the insurance 
                                                 
16 We discuss the ISO procedures briefly in Grace, et. al., (1999) and in Grace, et. al. (2000). For the moment, the 
reader should take these advisory Indicated Loss Costs as our best estimates of the expected annual costs resulting 
from policy features, structural characteristics and location of a property. The non-catastrophe portion of Indicated 
Loss Costs is based on actuarial experience and the catastrophe portion is based on catastrophe modeling results. As 
discussed below, the expected loss costs implied in individual insurers’ prices can vary from the ISO Indicated Loss 
Costs, which represent overall industry projected costs. Also, Indicated Loss Costs are not necessarily the same loss 
costs approved by regulators.  
 
17 ISO advisory loss costs filings and associated information present indicated, filed and implemented (i.e., 
approved) loss costs for a “base” policy and a number of rating factors and rules which effectively enable one to 
calculate a loss cost for a particular policy, reflecting a set of standard coverage and risk characteristics.  
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embodied in a policy. However, while the Coverage A limit reflects the homeowners perceived 
value of the home, it does not necessarily reflect the risk of loss to the home.
18 It is essentially 
the maximum possible loss rather than the expected loss.
19 We will therefore focus on indicated 
loss costs. 
As mentioned above, three loss cost equations will be estimated. The first is for the 
catastrophe coverage and the second is for the non-catastrophe coverage. The third will be for the 
total coverage. 
They will be of the following general form: 
          ,,1234 (,) iCNCTOT LFZFZXPe bbbb = =++++           (4) 
where  L(F,Z)i reflects the  quantity demanded of real insurance services measured by the 
Indicated Loss Costs for catastrophe, non-catastrophe, or total coverage, F represents a vector of 
policy form terms, Z represents a vector of neighborhood characteristics, X represents a vector of 
company characteristics, and P represents price. 
These general forms of the Premium equation (2), the Price equation (3) and the Loss Cost 
equations (4) will serve as the basis for our estimation procedures. They incorporate both non-
catastrophe perils and catastrophe perils or windstorms. The reader may think of these simply as 
separate features of the policy in question. We are interested in identifying the separate effects of 
these factors in our empirical analysis. 
 
Hypotheses 
The received theory on factors influencing demand for insurance products is rich and long, 
both in terms of the rational consumer model (e.g., Arrow, 1971) as well as in behavioral and 
experimental studies of protective behavior (e.g., Kunreuther, 1998b). The basic theory 
recognizes that, through pooling, insurance provides a mechanism to reduce the volatility of 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
18 Insurers typically require homeowners to insure at least 80 percent of the insured value of their home (e.g., its 
market value or replacement cost) and are reluctant to sell coverage significantly exceeding market value or 
replacement cost. Most insurers use a model or formula to estimate the market value or replacement cost of a home. 
 
19 Actually, the maximum expected loss encompasses the limits of all non-liability coverages minus deductibles, but 
other coverage limits are typically stated as percentages of the Coverage A limit. The standard HO3 policy contains 
standard percentage limits for these other coverage, but insureds may select alternative limits.  
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losses at a price, the “risk premium” or loading, that risk averse consumers are prepared to pay. 
Competition then assures that the coverages that are provided in the market are produced 
efficiently so as to minimize the total costs of providing such coverages, including the capital 
costs backing these policies. Behavioral and experimental studies of insurance underwriters and 
consumers (Kunreuther, et al., 1995 and Kunreuther, 1996), however, show that both the supply 
and demand of insurance is more complicated in reality. This is especially true in areas like 
catastrophe insurance where understanding and evaluating the peril itself is more difficult. Thus, 
in what follows, we begin with the standard hypotheses derived from the normative theory based 
on risk pooling among risk averse individuals. We are also interested in such issues as price 
dispersion (for similar policies), which would suggest less-than-complete consumer search or 
other “market imperfections” on the demand side. 
 
C.  Descriptive Statistics for Various Policies in Florida 
The basic contract features of the Florida policies are summarized in Table 1. The HO3 
policy is the typical contract s old. It has coverages for the home  and attached structures, 
detached structures, personal property, loss of use, personal liability, and medical payments to 
others. There are also options (not shown in Table 1) to cover personal property at a greater 
value than the standard limits, or to cover liability at a greater level than the standard limit 
($100,000), e.g., 10 percent of the home's insured value. The major difference between an HO3 
policy and an HO5 policy is that the HO5 policy has broader coverage provisions built in. While 
replacement cost coverage on personal property or contents is optional for the HO3 policy, it is a 
standard term of the HO5 policy.
20 Ordinance or law coverage is typically chosen as an 
endorsement on HO3 p olicies while it is a standard coverage in HO5 policies.
21 Also, HO3 
                                                 
20 Under the standard HO3 policy, the dwelling and other structures are covered on an “open perils” basis with 
losses settled according to the replacement cost of destroyed property. Contents or personal property are typically 
covered on a “named perils” basis with losses settled according to their actual cash value. Actual cash value is equal 
to replacement cost minus estimated depreciation or estimated market value. For other, more limited policy forms, 
all coverages are on a “named perils” basis, and losses may be settled according to replacement cost or actual cash 
value depending on the specific policy form and coverage (see Rejda, 1998). 
 
21 Ordinance or Law Coverage will upgrade a rebuilt house after a covered loss to the current building code. Without 
the coverage, the house will be "repaired" or rebuilt according to code only as long as doing so does not exceed the 
Coverage A limit on the policy.   
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policies typically cover contents on a “named-perils” basis, while HO5 policies typically cover 
contents on an “open-perils” basis.
22 Finally, there is a wind device protection credit that 
consumers in Florida can obtain if they have installed specified mitigation features, such as 
storm shutters or roof tie-downs. 
The difference between the HO3 and HO5 policies and the HO8 policies is the overall 
comprehensiveness of the coverage. HO5 and HO3 contracts provide open-perils coverage 
(except HO3 provides named-perils coverage on contents) except those specifically excluded 
while the HO8 policy covers a less inclusive list of named perils. HO8 policies have been 
designed primarily for homes in older urban areas.
23 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on  the various contracts in Florida during the period 
1995-1998. These data are aggregated at the Zip code level by certain contract characteristics.
24 
We see that HO3 contracts make up the majority of contracts written in the state by the sample 
companies during this period. Overall, HO3 contracts account for approximately 96.44 % of all 
contracts written by the sample companies. The other two policies, HO5 (3.54%) and HO8 
(0.14%) account for the remainder of the transactions sampled. It is apparent that most 
homeowners purchase HO3 policies and may select endorsements to supplement the standard 
HO3 coverages and limits. 
The average HO3 premium is less than the average HO5 premium while the average HO8 
premium is less than the average HO3 premium. This makes intuitive sense. The HO3 is the 
typical policy sold and it is more expensive than the less inclusive HO8 policy, but not as 
expensive as the more comprehensive HO5 policy. Further the price mark-up differs among the 
                                                 
22 ”Named-perils coverage encompasses a long list of perils, including windstorms, but if losses are caused by a 
peril not listed, the burden of proof is on the insured to show the loss is covered. Under “open-perils” coverage, all 
perils are assumed to be covered unless specifically excluded and the burden of proof is on the insurer to show that a 
particular loss is caused by a specifically excluded peril. 
 
23 HO-8 policies cover a more limited set of perils than other policy forms and theft coverage is restricted to 
property on the premises with a limit of $1,000. Also, as HO8 policies are often written on old homes, the insurer 
agrees to repair or replace a damaged home with materials of like kind and quality but not necessarily original 
materials or special workmanship such as plaster walls or intricate wooden moldings. 
 
24 Contracts for Tables 2 and 3 were aggregated by: 1) whether the contract had replacement cost coverage; 2) 
whether the contract excluded the windstorm peril (which often may be insured separately through the wind pool but 
not necessarily); 3) whether the contract was in a Zip code that was in the top 25 percent, middle 50 percent, or 
bottom 25 percent of median home values in the state; and whether its 4) wind or 5) fire deductibles were above the 
mean.  
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policies. The mark-up is the variable we employ as our definition of price and is defined as 
(1+r)(Premiums-Indicated Loss Costs)/Indicated Loss Costs. 
HO5 contracts have the highest average deductible followed by HO3 and then by HO8 
polices. We can also look at some of the contract terms across polices. While not many people 
obtained the wind protection credit, many purchased the additional ordinance or law coverage. 
Further, persons who purchased HO8 polices seem to live in areas with a lower ratio of 
catastrophe loss costs to total loss costs than people who purchased HO5 or HO3 polices. 
 
D.  Descriptive Statistics for Bundled Contracts 
Table 3 shows the average premiums and prices for bundled and unbundled HO3 contracts 
and for the average HO5 and the average HO8 policy. It should be noted that the average 
premium per contract for the HO5 policy is $934 and for the bundled HO3 policy with open 
perils/replacement cost coverage on contents, ordinance and law coverage and a wind device 
protection credit is $1067. It is interesting to note that there were 65 observations for the fully 
bundled HO3 policy while there were 1,457 for the HO5. These are essentially similar polices 
with different relative demands and different prices. Figure 1 shows the graphical relationship 
between the bundled contract terms and premiums and price mark-ups using the data from Table 
3. 
 
III. Demand Estimation for Florida Homeowners Policies 
 
In this section we undertake two related analyses. The first is an examination of the 
determinants of premiums and prices for HO3 policies in Florida. We then estimate the demand 
for homeowners insurance in Florida using two-stage least squares regression for HO3 contracts 
and then for both HO3 and HO5 contracts.  
A number of interesting problems develop in estimating demand. First is the issue of the 
level of aggregation one uses to estimate these models. It is possible to estimate the model at the 
individual contract level, but at some future time we need to be able to calculate cross elasticities 
of demand for the various contract terms. Thus, if we were to estimate the demand model at the 
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individual contract level, there would be no observations for contracts not purchased. 
Also, the market in which the consumer makes purchases is larger than the "home." This 
means that some homeowners may shop for insurance and that the demographic characteristics 
of a consumer’s neighborhood (in addition to the  consumer's home characteristics) may 
influence the type of insurance he purchases. Because we have the Zip code location of the 
insured house and we have access to Zip code level information from the Census, we assume, for 
now, that a consumer shops in a market defined by his Zip code.
25 
A second problem is that the demand for homeowners insurance is derived from the demand 
for housing. We account for the demand for housing by including the Census value for the Zip 
code's median housing cost as an endogenous variable. This variable reflects the value of 
housing services to the homeowner and is employed in housing demand studies as a proxy for 
the quantity of housing services demanded. Factors expected to influence housing demand 
include such  Zip code characteristics as median income, median travel distance to work, and 
Census reported housing characteristics for the Zip code  and  these factors are used as 
instrumental variables. 
We first estimated several models of the form (2) for PREMS (premium per contract) and 
PRICE1 (the price mark-up +   1) in order to understand the statistical association between 
observed premiums and prices and various explanatory variables in  our Florida database. Our 
primary interest is to determine the factors that appear to vary more or less significantly than the 
expected loss costs and expense costs associated with these factors might suggest.  
For example, as deductibles increase for a particular property, the expected loss costs and 
associated expense costs facing an insurer offering coverage for that property should decrease, 
all else equal. If price and premium levels for policies with different deductible levels exactly 
tracked the changes in the ISO advisory indicated loss costs for different deductibles, then 
additional variables in an estimated demand equation to reflect the level of deductibles purchased 
should have no additional effect. 
More generally, if there were no significant (perceived) quality differences in the coverage 
or policy services offered by different companies, one might hypothesize that the ISO indicated 
                                                 
25 We recognize that some Zip codes are quite large geographically and many are diverse demographically, but this 
is the smallest level of aggregation that will permit analysis of our data. Further work will also attempt to take into 
account the spatial relationships among the Zip codes or other markets.  
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loss costs would capture all the observed variation in policy premium and price. We will see that, 
in fact, this is not the case, perhaps reflecting price-quality tradeoffs and associated differences in 
company-specific attributes in the market. Indeed, a variety of factors beyond the ISO indicated 
loss costs influence observed premiums for and prices of insurance coverage in these markets. 
These factors include not only insurer characteristics, but also contract provisions, insured risk 
characteristics and economic/demographic variables. Reflecting the structure of (2), the factors 
of interest are separated into three groups: 
F =  Policy features or contract terms; 
X =  Characteristics of the company (in the State) that might be factors 
influencing demand (company effects); 
Z =  Characteristics of the structure, location and other factors influencing the 
expected losses on the policy over the period of insurance coverage (insured 
risk characteristics and neighborhood and demographic effects). 
 
For uniformity, we annualize all period (i.e., quarterly) values, such as losses, premiums, etc. 
Tables A1-A3 in the appendix to this paper provide a list of the potential (F, X, Z) variables 
available for use in this analysis. Note that Table A1 contains both information specific to the 
policy issued as well as to the type of structure insured. It also includes certain structural and 
protection features of the structure and the community in which it is located. The information in 
Table A1 is available for over 1.8 million house-years in New York and nearly 900,000 house-
years in Florida, or approximately 450,000 house-years in New York and 225,000 house-years in 
Florida, for each of the four years studied. In the data used below, however, we have a smaller 
set of usable data. In Florida, we have approximately 663,500 house years over the four-year 
period and in New York we have approximately 1.3 million house years. Some of the difference 
is due to incompatible records, the generation of new Zip codes over the reporting period 
(making their integration with collateral census data difficult), and missing information on some 
records. 
 
A. PREM and PRICE1 Regression Estimation 
We first estimate  PREM  and PRICE1  regressions using  ordinary least squares ( OLS)  
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regression. These are essentially hedonic equations that allow us to see how policy terms, insured 
risk characteristics, firm characteristics, and neighborhood variables affect the premium per 
contract and the price mark-up. 
In interpreting these results, it is important to recall what we expect to be measuring with 
our two dependent variables. We report two sets of results in Table 4: 1) the log of Premium per 
contract (LPREMS); and 2) the log of PRICE1 (LPRICE1). PREMS is the premium for a given 
exposure and is the total amount of money that the insured pays for his policy.
26 PRICE1 is the 
transformed price variable PRICE + 1 = (1+r)[PREMIUM-ILC]/ILC (adding 1 to PRICE simply 
assures that our price measure in (3) is always positive). 
Conceptually, the premium per policy consists of the expected loss cost (i.e., “pure 
premium”) and the insurer’s loading for expenses and profit. In terms of the supply function, 
some of our explanatory variables would be expected to affect one or the other component, but 
some variables may affect both components at different rates. For example, because of insurers’ 
fixed costs in servicing a given policy, a variable that has a positive effect on the expected loss 
cost may also have a positive but smaller relative effect on insurers’ expenses, i.e., loss costs 
increase at a greater rate than expenses. Hence, the coefficients for certain variables in the 
PREMS equation reflect a variable’s combined effects on the loss cost portion and expense 
loading portion of the premium. 
Further, it should be noted that we are using ISO indicated loss costs as an explanatory 
variable, which may differ from the indicated or regulator-approved loss costs assumed by each 
insurer in their pricing. We can calculate the former; we can only infer the latter. Hence, the 
effect of a given contract provision or risk factor (e.g., the type of structure or its location) on 
PREMS, represented by the coefficient for the variable, could also reflect deviations in insurers’ 
estimations of expected loss costs (or the loss costs effectively approved by regulators) from ISO 
indicated loss costs. 
Overall, when PREMS is the dependent variable, the independent variables are intended to 
                                                 
26 When there is more than one house-year reported in a given exposure record, which occurs when more than one 
contract shares exactly the same characteristics, PREMS is calculated as the total premiums for that record divided 
by the number of in-force house years, i.e., the premium per house covered. Similar adjustments are made for other 
“amount” fields, such as the total amount of insurance in force (the sum of the Coverage A limits on the homes 
represented in the data record), to transform all data elements to a per-house basis. 
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account for the premium  effects of calculated ISO indicated loss costs, deviations of insurer 
expected loss costs from ISO indicated loss costs, and other factors that would be expected to 
affect the expense and profit loadings that insurers build into the premiums they charge. 
PRICE is intended to measure the “loading” received by insurers in relation to the amount of 
risk protection (i.e., the expected payout on the policy) received by the insured, which is viewed 
as the real cost of insurance. When the loading is measured this way, a variable that has a 
positive effect on expected loss costs may have a negative effect on PRICE (the relative loading 
or price mark-up). This occurs when a variable increases expected loss costs at a greater rate than 
insurers’ expenses. 
Additionally, we are using ISO indicated loss costs in the denominator for PRICE as a proxy 
for the amount of risk protection the insured receives, rather than the indicated or regulator-
approved loss costs assumed by each insurer in their pricing. Hence, the coefficients for certain 
variables in the PRICE1 equation could also reflect deviations in insurers’ estimates of expected 
loss costs (or the loss costs effectively approved by regulators) from ISO loss costs.
27 
Of course, there are many other influences on the relative loading or price mark-up 
charged by insurers. It is important to keep in mind our assumption that this market is workably 
competitive. However, this does not imply price or premium uniformity since there are still 
potential significant variations in underwriting stringency, firm and product quality and service 
delivery features and some of these can be expected to survive in a competitive equilibrium. 
Since we also include the ISO indicated loss costs as explanatory variables in our hedonic 
equations, the other explanatory variables should reflect the effects of factors that are not 
reflected in the ISO ILCs.  Thus, our  statistical  results  include the effects of both consumer 
preferences for various policy features and efficient modes of delivering these features under 
competition, i.e. the alternatives consumers will actually see in the market. 
In sum, the statistical relationships we observe between the explanatory variables and 
premiums and prices in these hedonic equations can be influenced by both supply-side and 
                                                 
27 We should also note that ISO indicated loss costs do not include a “risk premium” factor, reflecting the additional 
return that should be earned by the insurer for the possibility that actual losses will exceed expected losses. This is 
especially important for the catastrophe portion of insurers’ costs, as these losses are highly volatile from year to 
year. Some insurers may include a “risk premium” in their loading and others may not. This risk premium should 
reflect the cost of objective risk to the insurer, which could be realized in the cost of diversifying or transferring this 
risk or the extra return that owners will demand for retaining this risk.  
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demand-side factors, imperfections in our measurement of expected loss costs, and our 
specification of the explanatory variables, as well as omitted variables. For any one variable, 
some of these effects may move in the same direction and others may move in opposite 
directions. This makes it difficult to sort out what is driving the statistical relationships we 
observe. Hence, we must be cautious in interpreting the results of these hedonic equations. 
 
B. Initial Hedonic Regression Results for LPRICE1 and LPREMS Regressions 
Table 4 Panel A shows the results of the premium (LPREM) regression and Panel B 
shows the price (LRPICE1) regression results. We estimated these regressions with three sets of 
explanatory variables: Policy Form variables, Demographic variables, and Firm Characteristics. 
What we show here is a representative set of regressions.  We also estimated a number of 
alternative specifications.  The regression estimates in Table 4 thus show a reduced form of the 
effect of various variables on prices and premiums. To examine each coefficient to determine its 
proper sign is not helpful at this stage because of the interaction of supply and demand influences 
in the reduced form.  What we desire to point out here is that even including loss costs, 
demographic, contract and firm specific variables we still do not get much above a 68 percent 
level of explanatory power for either model. In contrast, contract terms by themselves result in 
explanatory power of approximately 50 percent.  
To see how demand is ultimately influenced by prices and policy variables, bundling of 
contract terms, demographics, and firm specific variables, we must estimate a slightly different 
model that can take into account the endogeneities implicit in a demand model.  We undertake 
this analysis in the next section. 
 
C. Estimation of Quantity Demand  
Table 5 shows the results of our two-stage least squares estimation of the demand for HO3 
contracts for homeowners insurance in Florida.  In this estimation, we employed the indicated 
loss costs (in the logged form) as our proxy of the quantity of insurance demanded.  We also 
employed PRICE1 in the logged form as our proxy for price.  In the model estimated in Table 5, 
a number of variables are estimated as endogenous.  F irst, PRICE1 is estimated as an 
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endogenous variable in the first stage.  This is standard for demand models.  We also must 
account for a number of other possible endogenous variables reflecting housing value, 
deductibles, and the choice to invest in wind protection devices. 
We also estimate the demand for catastrophe coverage separately from the demand for non-
catastrophe coverage. We have estimated catastrophic related indicated loss costs for each policy 
in the sample.  ISO employed RMS to use their CAT model to develop these costs.  In addition 
we have ISO estimated non-catastrophic indicated loss costs which are loss costs developed by 
ISO based on previous claims.  Thus, we can think of the homeowners policy as a joint (or 
bundled) product where the coverages for both catastrophe and non-catastrophe perils are built 
into the contract. By estimating the two demands separately, we are acknowledging that different 
factors may affect the demands for insurance for these two perils. 
Table 5 Panel A shows the results for the demand for catastrophe coverage ( i.e.,  the 
catastrophe portion of total indicated loss costs), while panel B shows the demand for non-
catastrophe coverage (i.e., the non-catastrophe portion of indicated loss costs). Panel C shows the 
market observable bundled result.  Initially, two important results need to be discussed: 1) the 
price elasticity of demand; and 2) the income elasticity of demand. In panel C of Table 5 we see 
the coefficient on the log of PRICE1 (LPRICE1) for catastrophe coverage is approximately -1.15 
and this represents the price elasticity of demand. Essentially, this result indicates that a 10 
percent increase in  the  price  mark-up  will yield a 11.5 percent decrease in  the  quantity of 
catastrophe  coverage demanded. This is approximately unit elastic. If we examine the two 
bundled goods separately, we see evidence of very different behavior.  The e lasticity for 
catastrophe coverage (panel A) is positive, but not significantly different from zero and is quite 
inelastic.  In contrast, if we look at Panel B of Table 5, we see that the demand elasticity for non-
catastrophic coverage is –1.425.  Thus, a 10 percent increase in price will yield a 14.25 percent 
decrease in quantity demanded.  This is a relatively elastic demand. 
Another interesting observation is that while we cannot separate the two products, changes 
in external factors, including public policy changes, could influence the demand for both 
products jointly.  For example, a change in tax policy that would allow insurers to establish tax-
favored catastrophe reserves could increase the amount of insurance protection that is purchased.  
Our analysis suggests that small reductions in the overall price mark-up (which includes taxes on  
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catastrophe reserves carried in the form of additional surplus) will have a greater than 
proportional effect on the demand for insurance.  In other words, favored tax treatment for 
catastrophe reserves could foster better risk management by homeowners through the purchase 
of adequate insurance, rather than relying on externalizing their losses to other parties and/or 
retaining greater risk and the negative effects of this greater risk.
29 We intend to more 
specifically estimate the demand and supply effects of changing the tax treatment of catastrophe 
reserves in future work. 
We also see that the income elasticity of the demand for catastrophe coverage, reflected by 
the coefficient for the log of median income shown near the bottom of the table in Panel A 
(under marginal effects), is approximately –4.495  This implies that a 10 percent increase in the 
median income in a Zip code yields a 45 percent decrease in the quantity of  catastrophe 
insurance demanded.  This is highly sensitive.  In contrast, t he income elasticity  for non-
catastrophe insurance is positive and is estimated to be 0.567. Thus, a 10 percent increase in 
median income will yield a 5.67 percent increase in the quantity demanded.    When we analyze 
the combined demand for catastrophe and non-catastrophe coverages, rather than their separate 
demands, the income elasticity is approximately –0.784.  Thus overall, insurance is an inferior 
good. 
The empirical conclusion that insurance is an inferior good has a basis in theory.  Arrow 
(1964) conjectured that individuals have declining absolute risk aversion.  This implies that as 
income increases the demand for insurance should diminish.  Mossin (1968), in turn, proved that 
if a person faced a price of insurance greater than the actuarially fair value, but below the price at 
which no insurance would be purchased, and the consumer exhibited decreasing absolute risk 
aversion, then the amount of insurance coverage fell as wealth increased.  Mossin did not 
consider the case where higher incomes might generate more assets at risk and thus the higher 
income person would have greater losses to insure against. 
Further, Briys, Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1989) have pointed out, the income demand 
elasticity for insurance will be positive if and only if absolute risk aversion does not decrease 
                                                 
29 This externalization could occur through mortgage defaults, bankruptcy, tax deductions for uninsured catastrophe 
losses, and other demands on public services. We also know from the economic theory of expected utility under 
uncertainty that risk averse individuals value the reduction in uncertainty provided by insurance and will increase 
their utility by purchasing more insurance if the price mark-up of insurance decreases.  
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significantly rapidly enough or if and only if the variation of risk aversion is lower than a 
minimal bound.  Cleeton and Zellner (1993) undertake a similar analysis and operationalize 
Briys et al.’s conclusion slightly differently.  They find that the income elasticity of demand for 
insurance will be positive over all prices if f a + ? > 1 where f a is the elasticity of relative risk 
aversion to initial income and ? is the elasticity of the amount at risk with respect to initial 
income.  This implies that if potential losses change as wealth changes (which makes sense in 
our case as wealthier people may buy more expensive houses, exposing themselves to higher 
potential losses.) we may see a positive relationship between income and insurance purchased.  
That is, as income increases, we see an increase in non-catastrophic insurance purchased net of 
any decreasing effect on the demand for insurance due to decreasing absolute risk aversion.
30 
 
 Insured Risk Characteristics and Contract Terms 
The type of home construction is positively related the demand for cat and non-cat coverage 
while positively related to non-catastrophic cover.  This seems to suggest that relative to the 
omitted classification of house construction (superior fire resistant (SFR)) that owners of brick 
and frame houses believe their housing needs more catastrophic protection relative to the SFR 
housing.   
The median year that housing was built in the zip is negatively related to the demand for 
both coverages.  This comports with intuition as newer houses built to more modern building 
codes are less "risky" all other things held constant than older homes.  In addition, zip codes in 
areas with good municipal protection services (fire and police) would have lower demands on the 
margin for insurance coverage.  We find evidence of this as shown in table 5.  As the protection 
code increases (moving to lower quality municipal services), the demand for insurance for both 
types of coverage increases. 
 
Contract provisions that expand coverage would be expected to increase the demand for 
insurance if the marginal benefit of expanded coverage is greater than the marginal cost in terms 
                                                 
30 We estimated a regression between the log the median home value and the log of income holding other things 
constant such as the characteristics of the house, insurance prices, and neighborhood characteristics constant.  The 
elasticity of median house value with respect to income our measure of ? was estimated to be 1.04.  Thus, as long as 
f a was greater than (approx) -.039 we would expect to see a positive elasticity between income and the amount of  
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of a higher price.  Similarly, provisions that reduce coverage would be expected to decrease 
demand.  Factors indicating higher risk also would be expected to increase the demand for 
insurance and vice versa. 
Replacement cost coverage on contents is significantly negative for catastrophe insurance 
demand, and significantly positive for non-catastrophe insurance demand.  Consumers do not 
value this coverage for catastrophic cover.  The stronger association  for non-catastrophe 
insurance may be due to homeowners’ concern about the threat of theft. 
Ordinance/law coverage is significantly positive for both catastrophe insurance and non-
catastrophic coverage.  A strong positive association for catastrophe insurance could be 
explained by the greater relevance of ordinance/law coverage for the windstorm peril for which 
damage or destruction of the principal dwelling is the greatest concern.  Publicity concerning the 
need for homeowners to repair or rebuild their homes according to current codes after a 
hurricane could increase this demand.  
The windstorm protection credit is endogenously determined in our model. This credit is 
available for those who choose to purchase special shutters, for example.  It is significantly 
positive for both catastrophe and non-catastrophic insurance demand.  This makes intuitive sense 
for the catastrophic coverage demand.  The credit lowers the premium for the insured and 
contributes to homeowners’ incentives to invest in wind mitigation measures.  It also will have 
greater value as the wind peril and the catastrophe portion of the premium increases.  We would 
expect it to have no relevance to non-catastrophe insurance demand, but the bundling of the 
catastrophe and non-catastrophe coverage in most contracts may play a role. 
For both demands, we see that the fire deductibles are positively related to the quantity 
demanded.  A priori one can suppose that as the deductible increases the “quantity” of insurance 
demand decreases and that a deductible should be negatively related to quantity demanded.  
However, when the level of a deductible increases the price of coverage changes too.  Thus, as 
deductibles increase, it is possible the quantity demanded increases all other things equal.  This 
makes sense if the marginal benefit of a premium decrease due to the increasing deductible is 
greater than the marginal cost of a lower amount of insurance coverage. 
If deductibles do not affect the quantity demanded this implies that consumers have properly 
                                                                                                                                                             
insurance purchased.  
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maximized their utility taking into account the trade-off between increased deductibles and lower 
prices.  If we look at the wind deductible coefficients in Table 5 we see that they are both 
statistically different from zero.  The coefficient on the catastrophic demand is positive (but zero 
at three significant digits) while it is significantly negative (but zero at three significant digits) in 
the non-catastrophic.  This suggests that the wind deductible can be used to increase catastrophic 
coverage on the margin, while it has the opposite effect on the demand for non-catastrophic 
coverage.  While the coefficients are significant for all deductibles for catastrophic and non-
catastrophic insurance, the estimated coefficients are quite small and may not be different from 
zero in any economic sense. 
Demographics 
We have a number of variables that describe the housing stock and the population in Florida 
Zip codes.  Some of these variables convey additional information about the characteristics of 
consumers (and their homes) buying homeowners insurance, including the consumers 
represented in our sample.  Other variables indicate neighborhoods effects, i.e., the influence of 
characteristics of a homeowner’s area on his demand for insurance. 
Starting with the housing stock, we examine the median value of homes in the zip code.  
This is also an endogenously determined variable.  We use this to control for the consumer’s 
choice of housing.    Since insurance is a derived demand from the demand for housing we need 
to account for the choice of housing in the model.  For catastrophic coverage we see that this 
coefficient is positive (and relatively large) which suggests that consumers with higher values of 
homes have a higher demand for catastrophic coverage.  In contrast, the reverse is true for non-
catastrophic coverage.  Overall, the result in panel C suggests the effect of home value on the 
demand for insurance is significantly positive. 
The number of  residential structures  (1-4 unit  structures)  in a Zip c ode,  for which 
homeowners are eligible to purchase homeowners insurance, is a neighborhood control variable 
and can be thought of as a measure of housing (in contrast to apartments or condo) density in the 
Zip code.  It is positively related to the demand for non-catastrophe coverage and negatively 
related to the demand for non-catastrophe coverage.  
The percentage of condos in the Zip (which is an additional a control variable for housing 
mix) also affects the demands for catastrophe and non-catastrophe insurance differently.  For  
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catastrophe coverage it is positively related to demand, while for non-catastrophe coverage it is 
negatively related to demand.  The latter is understandable.  The greater the percentage of 
housing units that are condos in a market, the less demand there would be for homeowners 
coverage, all other things being equal.  It is not clear why this variable is related to catastrophe 
coverages, although it may be that the percentage of condos is related to beachfront exposures in 
a Zip, which could explain the positive association with the demand for catastrophe coverage.
31  
Moving to population characteristics, Zip codes with higher percentages of high school 
graduates and college-educated consumers have lower demand for both types of coverage (See 
the marginal effects section of Table 5).  The cause of this result is unclear as one might expect 
that homeowners with greater education may be more aware of catastrophic and non-catastrophic 
perils, which would have a positive effect on demand.
32  Alternatively, higher educated 
homeowners may be more adept at finding ways to economize on their coverage, such as 
installing safety devices that would decrease expected loss costs, our measure of the quantity of 
risk protection purchased. One should note Zip codes with higher percentages of college 
educated consumers appear to have higher demands than those zip codes with high percentages 
of high school graduates.  This is seen by the fact that the coefficient on college education, while 
negative, is lower in absolute value than the coefficient on the percentage of high school 
graduates in the Zip code. 
The percentage of people living in urban areas in a Zip code also is positively associated 
with the demand for catastrophe coverage, but negatively (although quite small in magnitude) 
related to the demand for non-catastrophe coverage.  This may reflect the greater population 
density along Florida's coastal areas. 
Zip codes with high percentages of married couples with children have a higher demand for 
catastrophe coverage, but a lower demand for non-catastrophe coverage.  The first result is 
consistent with our hypothesis that having children increases a homeowner’s desire for risk 
                                                 
31 We should also note that while we have excluded HO6 (condo-owners) policies from our sample, it is possible 
that some condo-owners policies are still in our database because they were not specifically identified as such. Since 
condo-owners policies only insure the contents and furnishings of a condo unit (the structure is insured by a separate 
commercial policy), the expected loss costs for these policies will tend to be lower, implying a lower demand for 
coverage based on our measure of quantity. 
 
32 Recall that our measure of the real insurance services provided is the loss costs.  Thus higher educated people may 
engage in personal risk management to reduce these loss costs.  
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reduction and insurance, but the negative coefficient for non-catastrophe insurance is puzzling.  
It is possible that families with children tend to face tighter budget constraints for what they can 
spend on insurance.  In this instance, higher premiums because of their exposure to catastrophe 
risk may force these families to economize on the amount of non-catastrophe risk protection that 
they purchase. 
Since Florida is a retirement state, we  are  interested in how age  affects the demand for 
insurance.  After controlling for the interaction effect of income, we find that the marginal effect 
age is insignificantly related to the demand for the bundled coverage, but its relationship to the 
demand for both cat and non-catastrophe coverage is negative and significant.  Thus as the mean 
age rises in a zip code, demand is lower.  However, as the percentage of retirees goes up (as 
measured by the percentage of people in the zip code that are 65 or older) , we see a negative 
effect on the demand for non-catastrophe coverage just as we see for the median age of the 
householder in the zip code.  However, we also see a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between the percent of people in the zip code over 65 years of age and the demand 
for catastrophic cover.  
The percentage of homes with mortgages is positively associated with the demand for 
catastrophe insurance and positively associated with the demand for non-catastrophe insurance.  
Since lenders typically require homeowners to carry hazard insurance, our a priori expectation 
was that having a mortgage increases the demand for insurance.  A second set of variables, the 
percentage of housing units where mortgage payments exceed 20, 24, 29, 30, percent of 
household income, is significantly positive for catastrophe insurance and significantly negative 
for non-catastrophe insurance. (The percentage of costs greater than 35 percent is omitted to 
avoid multicollinearity).We employ this ratio as a proxy for equity in the home.  As the ratio of 
mortgage expenses to household income increases we might conjecture that the householder has 
a lower level of equity in the house.  If that conjecture holds, as this ratio increases, then the 
option to default on a mortgage after a catastrophic loss increases in value.  Thus, zip codes with 
consumers with higher ratios of mortgage expenses to income are less likely to demand 
catastrophic coverage.  This is what we observe.  Those Zip codes with lower levels of mortgage 
expense ratios have higher demand for catastrophic cover, all other things equal. In contrast, if 
we look at panel B for the case of non-catastrophic coverage, we see little difference in the  
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influence of the ratio of mortgage expenses to household income.  For smaller, not-cat expected 
losses it appears that the consumer’s demand for insurance does not change as much as the ratio 
of mortgage expenses to income. 
Although homeowners with mortgages may be required to purchase an insurance policy by 
lenders as a precondition for obtaining the mortgage, budget constraints (particularly in the face 
of higher catastrophe insurance premiums) may prompt these homeowners to economize on the 
amount of insurance they purchase to the extent that their lenders allow. 
Firm Characteristics 
At this stage of the analysis, we limit firm specific variables to those that we believe may 
affect consumer demand.  We included the typical organizational form and marketing variables 
as controls, as well as the size of the firm in terms of total assets.  Further we look to examine 
cross marketing effects and the influence of A.M. Best Ratings.  We included A.M. Best ratings 
because consumers can use these easily as an indicator of company quality or financial strength 
when they decide to purchase insurance.
33    
Our results suggest that direct writers have a positive influence on the demand for 
catastrophic coverage and a negative influence on the demand for non-catastrophic coverage.  
Further, stock companies exhibit the same pattern.  These essentially are control variables 
reflecting the structure of the companies in the Florida homeowners market.
34  We also note that 
large firms (in terms of total assets) are related to higher demand.  This may be due to greater 
name recognition or economies of scale. 
In terms of cross marketing effects, the amount of auto insurance written in Florida by an 
insurer is negatively related to the demand for both catastrophe and non-catastrophe coverages.  
Thus, as the insurer sells more auto insurance in the state, it is likely to sell less homeowners 
insurance, as reflected by the amount of indicated loss costs.  This result may be due to an 
                                                 
33 The significance that consumers attach to financial strength ratings is uncertain, but there is reason to expect that 
these ratings have some relevance. Insurers typically advertise their Best ratings and agents typically convey this 
information to consumers. The ratings descriptions (Superior (A++, A+), Excellent(A,A-), and Very Good (B+, 
B++, Adequate (B, B-), are A.M. Best’s categories and are ranked in order of highest to lowest.  The omitted 
category is not rated companies. 
 
34 As shown below in Table 6, after controlling for whether the firm reports to ISO, the results are essentially 
unchanged.  However, we do not control for the selection affect of the decision to enter Florida, just the decision to 
report to ISO.  
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increasing tendency by individual companies to specialize in either auto or home insurance.
35  In 
contrast, we see that life insurance sales by  affiliated  companies within the same group  are 
positively related to the sale of homeowners insurance.  This latter result is consistent with our 
hypothesis that consumers view buying life insurance and home insurance from the same 
company as a benefit.  It would be interesting to see if this is true in other states.  We will 
undertake a similar analysis for New York to compare and contrast the results. 
It is conceivable that consumers value financial strength differently for catastrophe coverage 
and non-catastrophe coverage, where the latter involves more frequent claims.  Catastrophe 
insurance may be viewed as an unfortunate necessity, particularly for homeowners in high-risk 
areas forced to pay high premiums, for which quality considerations take a back seat to saving 
money on premium expenditures. 
The effects of the A.M. Best Ratings for the top three categories are significantly greater 
than the Non-Rated Companies on catastrophic cover.  Thus, consumers value the ratings to help 
them discern companies for catastrophic coverage.  In contrast only the Excellent and Superior 
categories had a significant influence in the demand for non-catastrophic cover.  This seems to 
make some sense as consumers will be more sensitive to a company if it is more likely to suffer 
financial distress from a catastrophe, but less sensitive to the a company’s financial strength if 
the risks are individually smaller and less likely result in the failure of a company.  Overall, the 
effect of the top three rating classifications is significantly positive, so it appears that for the 
bundled good that the ratings are important. 
We also estimate in a similar fashion the demand for HO3 and HO5 policies. These results 
are presented in Table 6. As mentioned above, HO3 policies represent a much greater number of 
policies than HO5.  Thus, our sample of zip code contract combinations where there is both HO3 
and HO5 policies being sold is smaller.  By adding HO5 polices to the model we obtain similar 
results for most variables.  For cat coverage the major changes for the elasticities are that the 
HO3 demand elasticity is now negative and is estimated to be –1.124.  The HO5 price elasticity 
for catastrophic coverage is –1.219 and the cross-elasticity of demand is very low, but positive at 
0.090.  A positive cross price elasticity indicates that the two services are substitutes while a 
                                                 
35 We should also note that we measure this variable at the company level rather than the group level. A group may 
segregate its homeowners insurance and auto insurance in different companies within the group.  
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negative elasticity would imply that the two services are complements.  Logic dictates that 
people can only buy one contract and that HO3 and HO5 contracts should be substitutes in 
consumption.  However, the cross elasticity is quite low which suggests that the consumers do 
not place a high value on the substitutability between the products. 
 For the non-catastrophic demand the results are also qualitatively similar.  The HO3 
demand elasticity is about one-half in size compared to the case when HO3 contracts are 
estimated singly.  The HO5 demand elasticity is much more inelastic, however.  Further, the two 
are again substitutes. 
Finally the income elasticity for catastrophic cover is lower in absolute value as the income 
elasticity estimated from the HO3 only model in Table 5, while the non-catastrophic income 
elasticity is about the same. 
The results of the model shown in Table 6 contain one additional variable.  This is the 
exclusion of wind peril coverage where the wind portion is excluded or transferred to a 
windstorm pool and it only applies to HO5 policies.  The exclusion of the wind peril is 
significantly negative for catastrophe insurance demand and significantly positive for non-
catastrophe insurance.  For these policies, the wind peril could be transferred to the wind pool or 
not covered at all.  In either instance, the homeowner may find this less desirable than having 
their primary insurer cover the wind peril.
36  Excluding the wind peril could have a positive 
effect on the demand for non-catastrophe coverage if homeowners seek to expand the latter to 
compensate for their lack of wind coverage.  Endogeneity also may play a role here if 
homeowners who exclude or have wind coverage transferred to the pool also tend to have more 
expensive homes which would increase non-catastrophe indicated loss costs, our measure of 
quantity demanded. 
  One further concern is raised is whether our sample companies are representative of the 
Florida market.  We address this in the next section. 
 
D.  Demand for Homeowners' Policies Controlling for Selection 
 
                                                 
36 It also should be noted that the wind pool may charge higher premiums for wind coverage than insurers. Our two-
stage procedure would not control for this price effect as our price measure only reflects the coverage provided by 
the primary insurer and not the wind pool.  
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One of the concerns of our model is that the companies reporting to the ISO may not 
represent the universe of companies writing in the Florida market.  In our sample we have some 
60 different companies in the sample over the four years.  In Florida, over the time period we 
study, this represents about 30 percent of the total homeowners' premiums written in each year.  
The firms that report to ISO may be significantly different than the other firms in the market.  
Thus, we control for this result by estimating a probit regression that attempts to classify those 
companies that participate from those that do not.  This selection model employs firm specific 
characteristics to determine whether the firm is an "ISO Reporter". 
The regression we estimate is: 
Probit (ISO Reporter=1/0 otherwise) =  
f(log of total assets,  
log of Florida homeowners premiums,  
Best Capital Adequacy Ratio,  
business concentration ratio (top four lines),  
geographical four state concentration ratio,  
percent of claims paid within two years,  
percent of claim value paid within two years,  
Stock Dummy, Direct Writer Dummy, and year dummies). 
From this regression we obtain the inverse Mills ratio for each observation as 
) ' ( / ) ' ( b b f l X X F - =  from the estimates of the probit regression where f(*) represents the 
normal density function and  F(*) represents the cumulative normal distribution function  (See 
Green 2000).  This variable can then be employed in the demand equation to account for the fact 
that some firms report to ISO an others do not.  In our model the coefficient on l in the demand 
represents the effect on the quantity demanded for a firm that is a participant in the ISO 
Reporting scheme.  If the coefficient is positive (negative) then the mean level of demand is 
higher (lower) relative to firms who do not report to ISO. 
For the model where we estimated the demand for HO3 contracts (Table 7) the selection 
indicator (l)  is significantly positive for both catastrophic and non-catastrophic coverage, thus 
implying that the ISO Reporting companies are more likely to be providing coverage than those  
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that do not report to the ISO.  Thus, the mean level of insurance demanded is higher for reporting 
companies than non-reporting companies.   
Table 8 contains the results of a model accounting for selection when we estimate the 
demand for both HO3 and HO5 contracts.  We see that the selection term for cat coverage is not 
significant, but it is significant for non-cat coverage demanded.  This suggests that reporting 
companies operating in markets where both HO3 and HO5 contracts are sold do not have higher 
mean levels of demand for their cat coverage.  Overall (and for non-cat coverage), the reporting 
companies have higher mean demands for their products than non-reporting companies. 
 The results for the contract and policy terms, demographic, and firm specific variables 
shown in Tables 7 and 8 are not qualitatively different than those reported in tables 5 and 6. Thus 
the fact that a firm reports to ISO does not have a material economic effect upon the other 
variables that influence demand.  The major exception is that for the ISO reporting companies in 
Tables 7 and 8 the A.M. Best Ratings are no longer significant. 
E.   Summary 
The main elasticity results are summarized in Table 9.  We see that in general the price 
elasticity for catastrophic insurance is more elastic than for non-catastrophic coverage.  Further, 
the income elasticity for catastrophic demand is also greater than for non-catastrophic coverage.  
By moving from the HO3 only results to those that include HO5 policies we see that the cat 
coverage elasticity of demand becomes lower and negative, and the non-catastrophic cover 
elasticity is also lower.  We also see that HO3 and HO5 policies are substitutes as the Cross-
Elasticity of Demand is positive but low in absolute value suggesting that these goods are not 
close substitutes. 
 It is important to note that the HO3 samples (Tables 5 and 7) and the HO3 and HO5 
samples (Tables 6 and 8) are very different.  We have not made an attempt to determine the 
differences yet.  For example, HO5 policies are not offered in every zip.  This could be for 
demand reasons (no one desires to purchase them) or it could be for supply reasons (no firm 
desires to sell them in that market). This needs to be address in the future. 
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IV.  Summary and Description of Future Work 
This paper is part of an ongoing project to estimate the supply and demand for residential 
property  insurance in Florida and New York.  We examine in an exploratory manner, the 
demand for homeowners HO3 and  HO5 insurance contracts in Florida.  We estimate these 
models with a 2SLS approach to account for  the  endogeneity of a number of important 
explanatory variables.  We first examine the hedonic forms of the price and premium OLS 
regressions to understand how policy terms, insured risk factors, neighborhood variables, and 
firm characteristics influence premiums and price mark-ups.  We also examine the quantity of of 
catastrophe versus non-catastrophe insurance demanded to show that there are some potentially 
important differences in the factors affecting the demands for these two coverages. 
The results for the OLS hedonic premium and price equations suggest that many factors 
affect these outcome measures.  In other words, variations in our calculated ISO indicated loss 
costs do not fully account for variations in the premium per policy or the price-mark up.  We 
believe that one contributor to premium and price dispersion is the deviation of insurers’ 
assumed loss costs from ISO indicated loss costs.  We also hypothesize that, in a workably 
competitive homeowners insurance market subject to certain regulatory constraints, varying 
consumer preferences and insurer product and service differentiation further contribute to 
premium and price dispersion.  
Two interesting and plausible observations arise from the demand analysis.  First, we find 
that catastrophe coverage is more price sensitive than non-catastrophe coverage.  Second, 
catastrophe coverage is an inferior good whose income elasticity is considerably  lower higher 
than non-catastrophe coverage.  Finally, we also not that the overall income elasticity ofr the 
bundled good is negative consistent with theory. 
The results for other variables hypothesized to affect demand are more mixed in terms of our 
ability to offer plausible explanations.  Among the results that tend to be more robust, it appears 
that factors associated with higher risk tend to increase the demand for insurance.  Also, greater 
demand for housing services as measured by home values, in turn, appears to increase the 
demand for insurance.  The effects of various coverage provisions on demand are less 
predictable.  Homeowners may tradeoff certain coverage enhancements and reductions as their 
premiums increase due to higher catastrophe risk.  Finally, we note that there does not appear to  
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be an important material difference between the ISO companies that report and those that do not 
report.   
In future work we will examine both New York and Florida.  This will allow a comparison 
of two regulatory regimes and two different markets.  In addition to homeowners insurance, we 
will also include data on the dwelling, fire and extended coverage contracts sold in each state.  
These latter coverages are substitutes for more bundled homeowners insurance policies.  
Additionally, we will refine our model specification to more accurately measure certain factors 
and incorporate potentially important omitted variables, such as underwriting stringency and 
quality of service.  Finally, we also will estimate the supply of homeowners insurance in the state 
markets that we would include in a joint estimation of supply and demand.  
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Appendix A 
Data in Florida Demand and Supply Study 
 
 
Table A1: Features of Policies and Structures 
Variable 
Name 
Short 
Description 
Comments and Codings 
COMPNO  Company Number (1-83)  Link to Company Data 
YEAR  Year (1995-1998)  0 (1995), 1 (1996), 2 (1997, 3 (1998) 
ZIP  Zip Code  Zip code 
STATE  State  Separate Panels for FL & NY 
TERRIT  Territory  Location Identifier for Cat-Losses 
POLICY  Policy Form 
HO1 (NY only), HO3, HO5, HO8 
Dummy Variables to Reflect Policy Form 
Coverages 
SUBLINE  Subline  Reflects Loss Settlement Basis( Dummy 
variable :1 if Replacement Cost Coverage) 
EXCIND  Exception Indicator  Dummy Variable: 1 = Wind Transferred to Pool 
STEXCIND 
or STEX 
State Exception Indicator  Dummy Variable: 1 = Off-Premises Theft 
Coverage 
ORD_LC 
or ORD 
Ordinance or Law Coverage  Dummy Variable: 1 = Coverage Pays Additional 
Cost Required To Repair a Damaged Home 
According To Current Building Codes 
FAM  Number of Families  Dummy Variable: 1 = Multiple Families 
TYPECON  Type of Construction 
Frame  
Brick 
SFR 
Dummy Variables to Reflect 
Different types of Structures 
YEARCON  Year of Construction  Dummy Variable: 1 = Constructed after 1960 
WIND_DS  Wind Deductible Size ($’s)  Wind Deductible Converted to $’s if Expressed 
as Percentage of COVA 
FIRE_DS  Fire Deductible Size ($’s)  Fire Deductible Converted to $’s if Expressed as 
Percentage of COVA 
PROTCD  Protection Code  Ordinal Ranking Variable for the Structure (1-
10), the Lower the Better 
BCEG  Building Code Effectiveness Grading  Community Grading 
COVA  Coverage A Limit  Dollar Amount of Coverage A Limit 
 
COVCPCT  Coverage C as Percent of COVA  In Standard Policy, COVCPCT = 50% 
COVELIM  Coverage E (Liability) Limit  Converted to $’s if expressed as Percentage of 
COVA 
ILC  Total ISO Indicated Loss Costs  Dollar Amount 
ILC_C  ISO Indicated Loss Costs Cat Portion  Dollar Amount 
ILC_NC  ISO Indicated Loss Costs NonCat Portion  Dollar Amount 
PREMS  Annualized Premium Limit  Dollar Amount 
PRICE  Annualized Price   
(1+r)(PREMS-ILC]/[ILC] 
PRICE1  1 + Annualized Price  Linear Transform of PRICE =PRICE + 1  
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Table A2: Company Data 
From the NAIC Annual Statement, Supplemented by Data from the AMBest Key 
Rating Guide as Indicated 
 
 
Variable 
Name 
Short 
Description 
Comments and Codings 
MKT_CODE  Marketing System Employed by the Firm 
Agent = 1 if an “agency writer” 
Direct =1 if a “direct writer” 
Dummy Variables to Represent Various 
Forms of Marketing and Distribution 
Systems 
Company ID  Various Identifiers for the Company and the Group in 
Which it Operates 
Link to AMBest Data 
CAPSURP  Capital and Surplus  Total Firm C&S 
BCAR  Best Capital Adequacy Ratio  This is a risk-based capital measure 
FSC  Best Financial Size Category  Discrete size categories based on Adjusted 
Policy Holder Surplus 
STRENGTH  Best Strength Category  Numeric coding from 1 to 9 Reflecting 
AMBest Rating, where 1 is the best (A++) 
RATING  AM Best Rating  Alpha Numeric Coding of Best Rating 
TOTASS  Total Assets  In $ 
LTOTASS  Log of Total Assets  In Log $ 
SOBnRAT  State Line of Business Concentration  The % of Total Firm Business in top “n” 
States in which it does business, a 
geographic concentration indicator 
HOME1  Homeowners is First Line of Business  Dummy Variable if HO is the highest % of 
Direct Premiums Written (DPW) to Total 
DPW for the Firm 
HOME2  Homeowners is Second Line of Business  Defined as in HOME1 
LOBnRAT  n-Line of Business Concentration Ratio  Percent of writings in the top “n” Lines of 
Business divided by DPW 
FLAUTO/ NYAUTO  Total of Personal Auto Lines Premiums in each State  An Indicator of Cross-Marketing potential 
for the Firm 
FLHOTOT/ 
NYHOTO 
Percent of Business in State (FL & NY)  Ratio of Homeowners to Total DPW in the 
respective State 
Table 2 Continues on Next Page  
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Table A2: Company Data (Continued) 
 
 
Variable 
Name 
Short 
Description 
Comments and Codings 
FLLPREM/ 
NYLPREM 
Total Life Insurance Premiums written by Companies 
in Same Group as the Firm 
An Indicator of Cross Marketing potential 
for the Firm 
HOMEDPW  Sum of HO Premiums in the State 
 
 
LHOMEDPW  Log of HOMEDPW 
 
 
TOTDPW  Total of Direct Premiums Written Nationwide   
TOTHODPW  Total Direct Homeowners Premiums Written 
Nationwide 
 
Organizational Form: 
Stock 
Mutual 
Organizational form 
 
Dummy Variables to reflect 
Organizational Form  
Mutual =1 if a mutual 
Stock= 1 if a stock 
HO_EX  Homeowners Line Expenses  Direct Loss Adjustment Expenses Incurred 
+ Brokerage Fees and Taxes, Licenses & 
Fees for HO Line 
HO_EX_RT  Expense Ratio for Homeowners Line  Ratio of HO_EX to Homeowners DPW in 
the State 
IEE_EX  Unallocated Homeowners Line Expenses  Amount of total Homeowners expense that 
remains unallocated after allocations to all 
States.  
C_OUT  Total Number of Claims Outstanding for the year in 
question and the previous two years 
 
C_REPT  Total Number of Claims Reported during the year in 
question and the two previous years 
 
C_RAT  Ratio of total number of claims outstanding to the 
number of claims (Reported and Outstanding) 
A Quality of Service Measure 
TOT_PD  Total Paid Claims From Past Three Years, in the year 
in question and the previous two years 
 
TOT_UNPD  Total Unpaid Claims from Past Three Years, the year 
in question and the previous two years 
 
TOT_RAT  Ratio of Unpaid Claims to Total Claims, i.e. the ratio 
of TOT_PD to TOT_UNPD 
A Quality of Service Measure  
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Table A3: Socio-Demographic Data Used in the Demand Analysis 
All data taken at the ZIP-Code level from the 1990 Census Data 
 
 
Median Householder Income In The Zip Code 
% Of Housing Units That Have A Mortgage 
% Of Housing Units In Which Mortgage Is Greater Than 30% Of Household Exps 
Average Age Of Householder 
% Of Housing Units Occupied By Owner 
% Of Income That Constitutes Retired Income 
Percentage Of People Above 25 Who Have Completed 12Th Grade 
Percentage Of People Above 25 Who Have A College Degree 
Median Year Structures Were Built In The Zip 
Median Value Of Structures In The Zip 
% Of Population That Is In The Urban Areas In The Zip 
% Of Population That Is In The Rural Areas In The Zip 
Number Of People Above The Age Of 16 
Number Of People Above The Age Of 25 
% Of Married Couples With Children In The Population 
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